The New Cold War - China and Taiwan
Decoding the Psychological Warfare and Evaluating the Real Threat of a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
There are a few things we know about the Cold War.
First, the Cold War ironically played a crucial role in preventing a third world war. It wasn't mere luck that saved the world from the third world war during the Cuban missile crisis; rather, it was an equilibrium outcome under the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction. The episode shows people at the top who might appear emotional, actually behave rationally.
To quote George Orwell,
Had the atomic bomb turned out to be something as cheap and easily manufactured as a bicycle or an alarm clock, it might well have plunged us back into barbarism, but it might, on the other hand, have meant the end of national sovereignty and of the highly-centralised police state. If, as seems to be the case, it is a rare and costly object as difficult to produce as a battleship, it is likelier to put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely a ‘peace that is no peace’. October 19, 1945, You and the Atomic Bomb
Second, nations possessing nuclear weapons avoid direct confrontation with other nuclear powers. Instead, they engage in proxy wars, as illustrated by the United States versus the Soviet Union durubg the Korean War.
Lastly, although hot wars continue to exist, many of them are simply the continuation of various nationalist movements that predate even the two world wars. The major faultlines are the Levant region, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Persian Gulf.
Now, let's delve into the situation in Taiwan. The following is also a review and critique of the widely acclaimed book, "If China Attacks," recently published by
"War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means," said Carl von Clausewitz.
I cite this line every time I write about war. There is no better way to understand why wars occur.
But before we proceed, I urge you to momentarily set aside any preconceived notions about the inevitability of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) invading Taiwan. I do have a reason for asking you to cast aside this belief: it's the essence of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) psychological warfare to condition people into believing that not only will the PLA invade Taiwan, but that such an invasion would be swift and decisive.
The book, "If China Attacks," has a lot of information about modern warfare, and in particular analysis of both the PLA’s and Taiwanese military capability and options. Those who are interested in the subject should definitely read it. In summary, the book debunks the myth that the PLA could swiftly conquer Taiwan with minimal effort.
Having said that, it doesn't entirely dismiss the possibility of such a war. It suggests that such an endeavor would be extremely costly and that Taiwan isn't entirely indefensible. The book posits a compelling argument that China's strategy involves convincing the Taiwanese people that if war were to break out between China and Taiwan, China's only chance of winning would be if the Taiwanese surrendered unconditionally without resistance.
The book also overlooks a significant question: Why would the CCP launch a war in the first place?
It's a common belief that the CCP will resort to force when its current leadership loses patience, with some even suggesting that it will launch an attack before 2027. This theory is predicated on the idea that such an action would bolster Xi Jinping's legitimacy. I find this perspective lacking in both logic and evidence. It seems more like an urban legend than a substantiated hypothesis.
Following Carl von Clausewitz, the first question we should ask is:
“What does the CCP want?”
The CCP seems intent on fostering the belief that its aspiration for unification represents the collective will of all Chinese people. Even critics who maintain a cynical perspective would suggest should CCP face discontent at home, instigating a war might distract the Chinese populace from persistent domestic social issues.
However, how exactly does a war divert people's attention? This assertion often lacks a convincing explanation beyond superficial and circular claims.
My take on the CCP's motivations is more straightforward: its primary objective is to maintain power. Therefore, we should ask the contrarian questions:
“What does the CCP perceive as the most significant threats to its rule?”
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been haunting the CCP since. Fearing a similar failure, the CCP will do whatever it takes to avoid the same fate.
If we examine how the last three dynastic empires - the Yuan, Ming, and Qing - we see a recurring pattern: the empire gradually lost control over peripheral territories, leading to fragmentation.
This is also how the Soviet Union collapsed; first the revolution in Eastern Europe, then the Baltic States. After a failed coup in August 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met in Minsk and agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union, forming the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place. Many former high-ranking Soviet Communist officials remained in positions of power even after the dissolution of the Soviet.
The CCP's worst nightmare is China disintegrating in a similar fashion. The party in fact has been extremely candid about this, by consistently asserting that the preservation of territorial integrity is its most crucial national security concern. Or, more accurately, this is the CCP's primal concern.
This line of reasoning illuminates the CCP's stringent control over regions like Tibet and Xinjiang. Realists might argue that maintaining buffer zones between major powers is essential to balance power dynamics. However, one must consider the realities of the post-Cold War era. Since 1949, no two nuclear powers have directly confronted each other due to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). With China, Russia, and India all being nuclear powers, the strategic value of a buffer zone for national defense diminishes considerably. Thus, the underlying reason the CCP cannot permit Tibet and Xinjiang to secede is the potential for a domino effect that might trigger a Soviet-style disintegration. In fact, generations of CCP elites harbor a profound disdain for Gorbachev, whom they perceive as having failed to maintain the integrity of the Soviet Union.
Another essential point I'd like to stress relates to Xi Jinping's lifelong tenure—a characteristic common to authoritarian states. Power transitions inherently pose significant challenges to these regimes. The CCP has notably managed, against the odds, to orchestrate two peaceful power transitions since Deng Xiaoping's era: first from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, and then from Hu to Xi. However, there's also clear evidence that internal factionalism within the CCP has been escalating since Jiang's reign. If this trend persists—particularly if factions evolve into regional and sectoral powers—it could eventually destabilize the CCP, mirroring the patterns observed in previous dynastic empires.
It is reasonable to assume that the CCP is acutely aware of this potential instability, which likely catalyzed its transition towards a more monolithic power structure after Hu. While many attribute Xi's ascendancy to his personal ambition and love for power, I interpret Xi as a product of the circumstances unique to the CCP. If not Xi, it's likely that anyone in his position would have pursued a similar path. Indeed, Xi has consistently emphasized the importance of unity within the CCP—a message he clearly intends to underscore.
Indeed, politics is the art of staying in power.
Let's delve straight into the heart of the matter. There is one particular scenario where the CCP might feel compelled to launch a military attack on Taiwan: that is, if Taiwan declares independence. I should clarify and reiterate that I'm neither advocating for nor against Taiwanese independence. Rather, I'm merely pointing out that this precarious equilibrium—understood by the CCP, the Taiwanese government, and other global powers, especially the United States—which has been the status quo since 1949.
The conundrum lies in the aftermath of Taiwan's presidential election in 1996. This turning point made prospects for a peaceful unification increasingly remote. It's also worth noting that if there was ever a time when Taiwan was in extreme danger, it was then. However, 1996 might have also represented the only opportunity for Taiwan to transition to a democratic society, which it indeed accomplished.
At the time, China lacked the capacity to obstruct Taiwan's democratic transformation. Consequently, every time there's an election in Taiwan, the CCP launches a propaganda campaign or engages in information warfare against Taiwan. The intention is to perpetuate the illusion of a potential future unification of Taiwan and China, despite the fact that no clear timeline or method for such a unification exists.
To quote from the book "If China Attacks":
"To most nations, peacetime is a period for war preparation, but for the CCP, there is no peacetime. It is always at war."
This also echoes George Orwell's prophetic assertion that the Cold War signifies a state of “a prolonged period of peace without peace”.
If you were to ask an average person in mainland China if they support taking over Taiwan, their immediate response is likely to be affirmative. However, if they truly understood the profound cost such a war would levy on the people on both sides of the strait, they might reconsider.
Moreover, if annexing Taiwan were a simple task, the CCP would have achieved it by now. We must not overlook the fact that even if a war were successful, governing Taiwan—an established democratic nation—under an authoritarian regime like the CCP's would be an impossible feat.
Therefore, the CCP's most rational strategy, which has been in place since 1996, is to perpetuate never-ending psychological warfare, instilling a state of fear and instability to keep Taiwan subdued and contained.
There are several key points to understand about psychological warfare.
Firstly, "propaganda" originates from the term "propagate," which implies that ideas spread, multiply, and evolve, much like a virus. Those infected with propaganda become carriers, disseminating the message further.
Secondly, the objective of information warfare is to instill fear and defeatism, with the ultimate aim of undermining the enemy's will to resist, leading to their capitulation. This allows a nation to inflict harm on another without resorting to physical troops.
Thirdly, it's crucial to acknowledge that every nation engages in some form of information warfare to some degree.
The book "If China Attacks" serves as an antidote to the CCP’s psychological warfare, providing readers with the information needed to counteract the spread of propaganda. Much like a vaccine, it helps people develop immunity against misinformation. This is one of the advantages of an open society: people, and civil society as a whole, have the capacity to inspire others through healthy debate. In contrast, we should always be skeptical of any information stemming from an authoritarian state, given that it always serves a particular agenda.
Lastly, I want to add a final note about rationality. In discussions about China, it's not uncommon to hear statements such as, "Dictators act in incomprehensible and unpredictable ways."
Such assertions often reflect a misunderstanding of the motivating factors behind actions taken at the state level, particularly in authoritarian regimes where transparency is typically lacking. However, this lack of understanding doesn't render these actions irrational. It's simply that most people are unable to perceive the constraints and pressures those in power are subjected to.
When you factor in the systemic threats every regime faces, the decisions made by those in power often appear to be quite rational and predictable. These leaders may undertake actions that seem costly, but usually, it's the citizens, not those at the top, who bear these costs. From their viewpoint, such decisions are perfectly rational.
It's crucial to keep this perspective in mind when evaluating the actions of authoritarian leaders. It fosters a deeper understanding of their motivations and anticipated behaviors, offering valuable insight into their strategic decision-making process.
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